tion to help clarify cognitive processes that exist in animals and humans, and also to explore phyletic differences in intelligence. One interesting cognitive process found in humans and some animals is the matching concept. The matching concept enables an animal to match identical stimuli even when no reinforcement history is associated with the stimuli. Matching is achieved conceptually and is not based on learning specific stimulus associations. The requirements for demonstrating use of the matching concept are articulated in the animal cognition literature (e.g., Thomas, 1996) . Generally, transfer tests contain novel stimuli to help researchers determine the extent of an animal's use of the matching concept. Test stimuli should be truly novel (i.e., training and test stimuli should be sufficiently different). If the test stimuli are not novel, then the animal may achieve correct responses through stimulus generalization.
Different species apply the matching concept at different levels of proficiency. Human children as young as 27 months use the matching concept (Brown, Brown, & Poulson, 1995) . Another study indicated infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can develop the matching concept after exposure to only two training stimuli (Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1988) . In studies involving a monkey species, Cebus apella, the matching concept was demonstrated, but appears to have a limited range of application (D'Amato & Colombo, 1989) .
In pigeons, the matching concept is not readily apparent. In most studies, pigeons appear to use simpler, nonconceptual processes in lieu of the matching concept (e.g., Carter & Werner, 1978; Wilson, Mackintosh, & Boakes, 1985) . Studies with rats and fish have yielded similar results (Thomas & Noble, 1988; Zerbolio, 1985) . These findings provide an interesting comparison with primates' use of the matching concept. The ability of species to learn and use abstract concepts (e.g., the matching concept) is considered to reflect higher intelligence (Thomas, 1980) .
In their study of the matching concept in animals, D'Amato, Salmon, Loukas, and Tomie (1986) examined responses of monkeys (Cebus apella) and pigeons (Columba livia) in identity matching (IM) and nonidentity, conditional matching (CM) tasks. IM requires an animal to process a sample stimulus and subsequently to match that stimulus with an identical comparison stimulus. Use of the matching concept is possible in IM tasks. CM is a different task, in which an animal associates and matches two noniden-tical stimuli. Use of the matching concept is not possible in CM tasks.
An animal with a poorly developed matching concept will probably process IM and CM tasks similarly (Carter & Werner, 1978; D'Amato et al., 1986 ). An implication of this similarity of processing is that an animal will respond similarly in both IM and CM tasks. However, if an animal learns these tasks in different manners (e.g., IM conceptually, CM by forming specific stimulus associations) then differences in responding in the two tasks might be observed (D'Amato et al., 1986) . Specifically, D'Amato et al. hypothesized that differences between baseline and probe response times would be similar regardless of which matching task, IM or CM, served as baseline or probe. This prediction was based on the assumption that CM and IM tasks are processed similarly. However, monkeys and pigeons might show differences in the patterns of their probe response times if monkeys use the matching concept on IM trials and pigeons do not.
To Our experiment replicates and extends D'Amato et al. 's (1986) research to human participants. Since humans are capable of using the matching concept (e.g., Brown et al., 1995) , we hypothesize human performance will resemble monkey, rather than pigeon, performance. This hypothesis is based on the suggestion by D'Amato et al., that use of the matching concept is the reason for monkeys' differential processing of IM and CM tasks.
Method Participants
Participants were 21 students in the undergraduate Experimental Psychology course at the University of Georgia. Sixteen participants were women (M = 20.7 years old, SD = 0.77) and 5 were men (M = 21.2 years old, SD = 0.70). None of the participants were aware of the hypotheses of the experiment, and all individuals were treated according to the ethical principles of the American Psychological Association.
Apparatus
IBM-compatible computers were used to present stimuli and record the participants' responses. Some participants used computers located in university computer labs, and others used their own computers in their homes. Participants responded with two keys on the keyboard; stimuli appeared on the monitor screen.
The program running the experiment was written by one of the authors (M.S.) in Turbo Pascal version 7.0 (Borland International, Inc.). The program incorporated a subroutine for ms response time calculation developed by Bovens and Brysbaert (1990) . The program was stored on computer disks distributed to the participants. The participants' response data were recorded on the same disks.
Stimuli
The stimuli were similar to those used for the monkeys and pigeons in D'Amato et al.'s (1986) research. They were a red, filled circle (35 mm diameter); a white, unfilled, inverted, equilateral triangle (45 mm sides); a white, filled circle (5 mm diameter); and a white vertical line (45 mm).
Experimental Design
The experimental design was a mixed, 4 × [2 × 5 × 2] design. All independent variables (IV) were to obtain sufficient data while ensuring that the participants would not have to remain at the computers for more than one class period. Among the 28 trials that made up each session of the test cycles, 24 trials were baseline trials and 4 were probe trials. The first 4 trials of the 28 were always baseline, and within the remaining 24 trials, each successive block of 6 trials contained 1 randomly-placed probe trial (cf. D 'Amato et al., 1986) .
The instructor for the participants' Experimental Psychology course introduced the participants to the study by informing them that the study would constitute their class research project for the quarter. Since the purpose of this study was to replicate and extend D'Amato et al. 's (1986) work with nonhuman animals, few specific instructions were given to the participants regarding the tasks. The only instructions given to participants were to try to respond correctly, and which keys to use for responding. The participants did not receive instructions to respond quickly. Upon completion of the tasks, all participants received debriefing concerning the hypotheses of the experiment, and all were given copies of their response data.
Although extraneous events could be controlled to some extent in the university computer labs, participants who performed the tasks at home may have been exposed to noise or other distractions. Participants in the computer labs performed the tasks with very short breaks between sessions. However, participants performing the tasks at home may have taken longer breaks.
At the start of each trial, the sample stimulus (either the inverted triangle or the white circle) appeared in the middle of the screen for 1 s. The sample then disappeared, and the comparison stimuli appeared on the left and right sides of the screen.
On CM trials, the correct comparison stimulus for the white circle was the vertical line, and the within-subjects factors except task order, which was a between-subjects factor. The first IV was task order with four levels (described below in the Procedure section). The second IV was test cycle with two levels. One level consisted of IM probe trials interspersed within CM baseline trials (CM/IM test cycle), and the other level consisted of CM probe trials interspersed within IM baseline trials (IM/CM test cycle). The third IV was test session with five levels (i.e., five sessions within each test cycle). The fourth IV was trial type with two levels, baseline and probe trials.
Procedure
The participants received 4 practice sessions, 2 each of IM and CM, in addition to the 10 test sessions within the test cycles. Participants were randomly assigned to four different orders of practice sessions and test cycles to control for the effects of task order on performance (see Table 1 ). Before the first test cycle, the participants received three practice sessions. For example, participants assigned to Task Order 1 received three practice sessions, one of IM trials and two of CM trials, in the order shown in Table 1 . Practice sessions for participants assigned to the other three task orders are interpreted similarly.
After the first three practice sessions, the participants began an IM/CM or CM/IM test cycle, followed by the fourth practice session, followed by the second test cycle (see Table 1 ). The practice session immediately preceding each test cycle involved the same type of matching task (IM or CM) as the baseline trials of the test cycle. This tactic was intended to get the participants into the IM processing or CM processing "mode" so that probe effects would be magnified (D'Amato et al., 1986) .
Each practice session consisted of 48 trials, and each test cycle consisted of five 28-trial sessions. Five sessions in each test cycle were considered enough incorrect comparison stimulus was either the red circle or the triangle (determined randomly). The correct comparison stimulus for the triangle was the red circle, and the incorrect comparison was either the vertical line or the white circle. On IM trials, the correct comparison stimulus for the white circle was an identical white circle, and the incorrect comparison was either the red circle or the triangle. The correct comparison stimulus for the triangle was an identical triangle, and the incorrect comparison was either the vertical line or the white circle.
The correct comparison stimulus appeared on either the right or the left of the screen on each trial (determined randomly). Participants pressed the decimal point key on the number pad to choose the comparison stimulus on the right, and the zero key on the number pad to choose the comparison stimulus on the left. After participants responded, the comparison stimuli disappeared from the screen, and the participants received feedback regarding their response. The word "Correct" or "Incorrect" appeared on the screen for 2 s.
Results
For each test cycle (IM/CM and CM/IM), two mean response times were calculated for each participant in each test session: one for the baseline trials and one for the probe trials. The baseline means for all participants were then averaged to give the mean baseline response time for each session of each test cycle. Likewise, the probe means for all participants were averaged to give the mean probe response time for each session of each test cycle. Figures 1 and  2 depict these data.
The main effect of test cycle was statistically significant, F(1, 17) = 12.0, p = 0.003, omega squared (# 2 ) = 0.03. The mean response time for all trials of the CM/IM test cycle (0.57 s) was significantly faster than the mean response time for the trials of the IM/ CM test cycle (0.62 s).
The main effect of test session was also statistically significant, F(4, 68) = 20.0, p < 0.001, # 2 = 0.15. Mean response time decreased across test sessions, from 0.68 s in the first session to 0.57 s in the fifth session, averaged across the other IVs (see Figures 1 and 2 ).
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FIGURE 1 Group mean response times (s) on the baseline and probe trials during the IM/CM test cycle (N = 21).
The main finding of this experiment was that response times were significantly slower for CM probes against the IM baseline (IM/CM test cycle) but not for IM probes against the CM baseline (CM/ IM test cycle). This finding is reflected in the main effect for trial type and in the interaction between trial type and test cycle. The main effect for trial type (baseline or probe) was statistically significant, F(1, 17) = 64.2, p < 0.001, # 2 = 0.13. The mean response time for baseline trials was 0.53 s, and for probes the mean response time was 0.67 s, averaged across the other IVs. Figure 1 shows probe response times are slower than baseline response times in the IM/CM test cycle, accounting for this significant difference. The two-way interaction between test cycle and trial type was also significant, F(1, 17) = 64.7, p < 0.001, # 2 = 0.13, again demonstrating the difference between baseline and probe response times was dependent on test cycle.
Comparison of baseline and probe trials of the same type of matching task was done in a separate analysis and also revealed significant differences. IM probe trials produced significantly slower response times compared to IM baseline trials, F(1, 20) = 23.4, p < .001, # 2 = 0.10, and CM probe trials produced significantly slower response times than CM baseline trials, F(1, 20) = 29.6, p < 0.001, # 2 = 0.12. The interaction between test session and trial type was also significant, F(4, 68) = 7.1, p < 0.001, # 2 = 0.06. The difference in mean response time between probe and baseline trials was greatest in the first test session and then decreased in the remaining test sessions.
The possibility of an effect of task order on performance was tested by comparing the mean response times of participants assigned to the four different orders of the tasks. There was no significant difference in mean response time across the task orders, F(3, 17) = 0.51, p = .678. However, there was a significant interaction between task order and test cycle, F(3, 17) = 7.25, p = .002. A Tukey's multiple comparison test showed that for participants assigned to PROCESSING OF IDENTITY AND CONDITIONAL RELATIONS Chan, Perera, Robinson, and Schmidt
FIGURE 2 Group mean response times (s) on the baseline and probe trials during the CM/IM test cycle (N = 21).
Baseline trials were conditional matching (CM) trials and probe trials were identity matching (IM) trials. The interaction between task order and trial type was not significant; response times to probe trials were slower than response times to baseline trials in each task order. Likewise, the interaction between task order and test session was not significant. Taken together, these results indicate random assignment of participants to the four task orders provided an adequate control for effects of task order on performance.
Discussion
In support of D'Amato et al. 's (1986) findings for monkeys but not pigeons, the present results provide additional evidence that primates process identity and nonidentity, conditional relations in different ways. The response times to CM probes were slower than to IM baselines, but the response times to IM probes were not elevated over those to CM baselines.
Anticipation of the correct comparison stimulus is one of two factors accounting for these results. Participants could start anticipating the correct comparison stimulus during the sample duration, while the sample stimulus was still on the screen. They were able to do so because most of the trials in the test sessions were baseline trials, either CM or IM, and the participants had learned which comparison stimulus was paired with each sample in each task. When the two comparison stimuli appeared, participants could choose the one they had anticipated during the sample period.
In contrast, on probe trials the participants were not able to anticipate the correct comparison stimulus. In fact, they did not even know when a probe trial would appear and would realize that a trial was a probe only when they saw the pair of comparison stimuli. Only after the two comparison stimuli appeared could the participants decide which to choose. This difference explains why the response times on CM probe trials in IM/CM are significantly slower than on CM baseline trials in CM/IM, and why the response times on IM baseline trials in IM/CM are significantly faster than on IM probe trials in CM/IM. The type of matching task (IM or CM) is the second factor accounting for the results. Conditional matching involves two steps, the first of which is to retrieve the correct comparison stimulus, and second, to distinguish it from the other comparison stimulus. According to D'Amato et al. (1986) , identity matching can be accomplished with only the second step. Use of the matching concept during IM does not require retrieval of the stimulus associated with the sample. Because identity matching involves one less step than conditional matching, the response time to IM probes is necessarily faster than to CM probes. This use of the matching concept could account for the fast responses to IM probes in the CM/IM test cycle compared with responses to CM probes in the IM/CM test cycle (D'Amato et al., 1986) .
It should be emphasized, however, that use of the matching concept cannot be concluded unequivocally in this experiment. Recall that demonstration of use of the matching concept requires tests with novel stimuli. The four stimuli presented to our participants, and those used by D' Amato et al. (1986) , were the same across test sessions and trial types. The most that can be concluded is humans process identity and conditional matching in different ways. Other perceptual/cognitive processes could be involved in this differential processing. Extensions of this research in which the similarity between sample and comparison stimuli is systematically varied would provide data relevant to this question. If the difference between probe and baseline response times in the IM/CM test cycle systematically changes as a function of this similarity, then the data would seem to favor a perceptual rather than conceptual explanation (see Farrell, 1985 , for a review of "same-different" processing in humans and a discussion of situations in which identity is processed more rapidly than nonidentity).
The experimental paradigm developed by D' Amato et al. (1986) and utilized in the present experiment provides a way to compare species' abilities to process stimulus relations such as identity and nonidentity. Comparative research such as this is necessary to understand the distribution of intelligence across the animal kingdom. The recording of animals' response times has allowed for the design of new types of experiments addressing the information processing abilities of nonhumans. Response time measures coupled with the advent of new computerized technologies for recording animals' responses to stimuli (e.g., touchscreens) will facilitate new avenues of research in the comparative analysis of human and nonhuman intelligence.
